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1

Jane W. Gibson
Department of Anthropology
University of Kansas
Introduction
Exclusion of local communities from the
ecosystems on which their livelihoods and lifeways
depend, in the interest of ecosystem protection,
always results in poverty and very often in ecosystem degradation. People cannot and should not
be alienated from their traditional uses of natural
resources. Rather, they should be encouraged to
make sustainable use of these resources, and they
should be authorized to manage their local ecosystems toward that end.
These statements concede a marketoriented development, but one characterized
by local control over the ways and the extent to
which community resource managers interact
with markets. At the same time, the ambiguity
inherent in the term “sustainable development”
should be exploited such that local users possessing ecosystem knowledge can help define it. What
must be sustained, at what levels, and for whose
benefit? Therefore, contrary to arguments against
“sustainable development,” it is its imbiguity which
contains both its conceptual and practical strength.
In a recently published article, Willers
(1994) refers to the “chameleon” quality of the term
“sustainable” as it is used opportunistically by those
who would propagandize perpetual growth for
profit. Likewise, my own observations in Florida
include this cynical use of sustainable development
rhetoric. Yet , where terms are negotiated between
local populations and resource managers, other
meanings and agendas can join the discourse to
work for a different outcome. Indeed, research

has taught us that fragile environments and their
human inhabitants can hope for long-term survival
only to the extent to which local communities
retain control over their resources and can develop economically (so as to purchase power and
autonomy).
To make the case for local management of
fragile ecosystems within which selected resources
are to be exploited, commodified, and sold, I start
with the history of development in Florida, with
special attention devoted to the rural part of a
north-central county where I carried out field research from 1988 to 1992. Florida is a particularly
useful case study because it includes several relevant
development “projects:” colonial “displacement”
of indigenous peoples, a voluntary resettlement
program known more commonly as a homestead
law, one hundred years of relatively unmediated
local natural resource management, plus fifty years
of state management. Certainly, the particular
historical conditions for each of these management
regimes precludes any direct extrapolation to development in general, or to any specific project site.
But the Florida case remains instructive for several
reasons. First, the duration of local and then state
management of, wetland and lacustrine sections of
Orange Creek Basin, in particular, can still teach
us something about the potentials of grand-scale
social engineering carried out in the absence of a
blue-print for the future.
Second, Florida’s historical development
is based on a continuum of tourism types from
“ecotourism” to mass tourism. Early recruiters
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to the state, many of whom were themselves land hands, but has used these tools to transfer control
speculators, advertised Florida’s natural resources over, and access to, natural ecosystems from “the
(sun, soil, hunting and fishing), just as ecotourist people” (for whom the law says flora and fauna are
shills do all over the world today. In its advanced to be held in trust) to the state and to moneyed
state of tourist development, ecotourism remains constituencies of resourceful politicians.
To say that the social, economic and
important in parks and preserves, as well as in alecological
costs of modernization are managed,
ligator management which combines sustainable
use with conservation investment and education. however, does not mean that damage to people and
Nonetheless, this is only part of a larger tourist ecosystems is avoided. Rather, this kind of manageindustry which also attracts snow-birds and college ment may work only for the short term, inasmuch
students to beach front condominiums and million as the politics of grand-scale modernization–dedollar theme parks. Thus, in many ways Florida pendent on the “exclusion principle” (Stocks
can be seen as a paradigm of tourist-dependent 1995)–undermines local interest in protecting
fragile ecosystems for the long term. Inevitably, as
modernization.
Third, the case study material presented a substantial literature now demonstrates, poverty
demonstrates how local control over the extrac- exacts its own price against fragile ecosystems. This
tion and commodification of natural resources can fact alone speaks to the need for local economic
translate into a sustainable symbiotic relationship development. The question then is not whether
between cultural and biological diversity. It also to promote economic development for those who
demonstrates the costs of exclusion from use or live in or near fragile ecosystems, but how to effect
the structural and ideological changes prerequisite
control of those resources.
Florida’s development, analogous to his- to local control over the development process. The
torical colonial and contemporary development case study of Shellcracker Haven, Florida2 offers
schemes in Less Developed Countries ( LDCs), relevant insights.
Over the course of four years during which
teaches important lessons about large-scale, topdown capitalist development. Not the least of I conducted field research in Shellcracker Haven,
these lessons—indeed, it is perhaps the most I concentrated on the relationship between this
important—is that such development can be very community’s material, social and ideological deprofitable for the select few who can afford the velopment in the context of changing state interest
investments. The importance of this lesson comes and effectiveness in natural resource management.
from its ability to focus our attention on the locus I found that the families of the town are historiof power where development benefits explain why cally rooted in an extraction-based economy, that
the devastating consequences for those pushed out emic views of their relationship to the local wetland
of the way seem of little concern to development ecosystem incorporated values which included,
but went beyond, profitability, and that exclusion
beneficiaries.
A second critical lesson is that the social, from management and economic use of wetland
economic and ecological crises created in the wake resources undermined local concern for wetland
of modernization can be managed through a com- protection.
bination of conservation rhetoric, which vilifies
those who depend on natural resources for their Modernizing Florida
Florida’s development began with religious
livelihoods and lifeways, and police authority to
and
military
aggression against a large and diverse
enforce their exclusion. These lessons are not, of
course, unrelated. Advanced capitalism has not aboriginal population. The territorial government
only channeled vast wealth and power into a few secured its success in these early exclusionary
2
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ventures with passage of the Armed Occupation
Act of 1840, a homestead act designed to attract
Euro-American families from North Carolina,
South Carolina and Georgia to the piney woods
frontier. Here, settlers would act as a buffer against
the predictable retaliation of surviving Indians, not
those driven west into Oklahoma, but those forced
south into the swamps of the Everglades.
Shellcracker Haven was one of these buffer
communities where yeoman farm families settled.
They produced their subsistence with vegetables,
a few cows, pigs, chickens and occasional fishing on Shellcracker Lake when time permitted.
Meanwhile, the young government set about the
business of further territorial control and market
development by permitting and subsidizing widespread wetland drainage and railroad construction
through the Internal Improvement Association.
Speculators began buying and selling the land
billed variously in flyers as Florida’s surf, sun and
soil where buyers could expect great hunting and
fishing.
Thus, Florida’s development 150 years
ago anticipated today’s ecotourism development
frenzy. And, just as LDCs construct roads today
to facilitate the migration of affluent eco-tourists
to “pristine” hinterlands, the territorial government of Florida subsidized roads, canals, river
improvements and railroad construction. These
investments in infrastructure opened up the interior to settlement, commerce, and control. In
1851, the General Assembly created the Internal
Improvement Board “to manage the swamp and
overflowed lands,” and 500,000 acres of public
land transferred from federal to state ownership
when Florida entered the Union (Tebeau 1971).
Under the Bourbon administrations3 of
governors Drew and Bloxham, Florida’s landscape
changed dramatically. The Bourbons set the standard for government encouragement of and noninterference in development. Lands were sold cheap
to developers among whom was Hamilton Disston.
Disston bought 4 million acres of south Florida at
$.25/acre when the going rate for squatters already
3
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on the land was $1.25/acre. Much of south Florida
was wetlands which Disston also contracted to
drain by dredging canals in exchange for half of
what he drained. In the end, he received over 1.65
million acres, drained permanently 50,000 acres,
and “improved” forty miles of canals and rivers.
It was also under the Bourbons that, by
1900, Florida’s railroads extended to some 1500
miles of tracks, including two parallel lines which
cut north-south on either side of Shellcracker Lake,
and one which ran east-west across its northern
end. In addition, a spur line extended to the lake
edge in Shellcracker Haven. It was no accident that
Senator David Yulee, who also sat on the Internal
Improvement Association board and owned stock
in the railroad, owned an orange grove on the
edge of Shellcracker Lake. The railroad shipped
his oranges, and it made cash cropping for local
farmers, plus commercial fishing, viable incomeearning opportunities.
Cash cropping and commercial fishing
created other employment opportunities in what
quickly was becoming a regionally integrated
market economy based on exploitation of local
natural resources. Crates to ship vegetables were
manufactured in the next railroad town to the
south from locally available wood; women harvested, cleaned, sorted and packed Ford Hook
lima beans, squash, strawberries and other kinds
of produce into these crates. Women and children
from the family-owned turpentine still operation,
which employed their husbands, supported cash
crop production with their labor. This cash in turn
went to the company store and to other small businesses in the area. Men and boys also found work
in local orange groves and on a celery farm nearby.
Two other families opened stores in Shellcracker
Haven to sell staples such as lard and flour.
A family established a mill on the lake to cut
cypress for construction of the local institutional
infrastructure, including businesses whose success
depended on the circulation of goods, services and
cash in the local economy. Milled cypress also was
used to build a fish house at the end of the peer

Named for the family that ruled at different times in France, Spain, and in Naples.
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ultimately
drove
lake
front
property
taxes so high
next to the railroad’s spur line. Here, men emptied
the pockets of seines, pulled in hand- over-hand that most local families were forced to sell. In
from Shellcracker Lake. Then they cleaned, iced addition, the sport fishing constituency became
and shipped panfish on the train, in locally crafted politically influential as its financial contributions
barrels, to “northern” markets such as Jacksonville. to fish and game management increased. Yet, in the
The Depression came and went in Shell- state capital at Tallahassee, the legislature seemed to
cracker Haven and hardly made a dent as house- dissolve the management agencies it created before
holds made the transition to a barter economy management problems could be addressed. The
based on the long-standing tradition of interde- growing conservation consciousness in the state,
pendence and mutual support among kin groups. facilitated by awareness of the massive wetland
At least four generations of children had grown drainage required by development, demanded a
up with fishing poles and cast nets, watching their strong, competent and adequately funded manageparents earn their living farming and fishing in ment agency .
the wetland basin. Men earned status and money
from their work, and women, as they do all over the The Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Comworld, secured social relations with friends, neigh- mission
The legislature’s capricious budgetary
bors and relatives as they also earned money and
authority
and numerous failed incarnations of
raised the next generation. Together, the families
of Shellcracker Haven built the town: a school, a resource management agencies only compounded
church and each other’s homes, and in so doing, problems of conflicting local laws and statewide
they built community. They married, gave birth, enforcement impotence. The solution to the
loved and fought and, in the end, always buried frustration which resulted came from the Florida
their families in the local cemetery. In short, by Federation of Wildlife (FFW) which, by this time,
the turn of the century, the families of Shellcracker had become active and vocal in its determination
Haven were firmly rooted in their wetland basin to eliminate commercial fishing from the state of
Florida. This well-organized and well-financed
home.
The transformation of the American econ- recreational user group had the support of the
omy after World War II changed all that. Labor Florida Chamber of Commerce (FCC) whose
became scarce and expensive after the turpentine members also believed the state’s most profitable
still closed down, and crop prices declined with the future lay with continued tourism development,
increased production of large, year-round farm op- and that commercial fishing stood in the way of
erations in the south. Most of Shellcracker Haven’s real economic growth in sport fishing and related
small farm operators sold out to a large corporation industries. Commercial fishing, they argued,
which turned pine trees into paper products. Only caused the decline in “sport fishing satisfaction”
one man kept his family’s land by going to work by removing bass, the favored sport fish for which
for the company. Another survived by leasing Florida’s lakes are famous, with their seines. Comcompany tracts on which he grazed his cattle. But, mercial fishermen denied these charges.
The management agency hired its first
with these exceptions, only those families engaged
in commercial fishing, dependent on family labor biologists then and determined to manage fish
and an expanding market for fresh fish, came away and wildlife on a scientific basis. They initiated a
study to determine the relationship between comintact.
Then the rising tide of post-war tourism mercial and recreational fishing. These nationally
took its toll on Shellcracker Haven. Growth in peer-reviewed studies showed that the relationrecreational fishing spurred the development of ship between sport and commercial fishing was a
fish camps and vacation or retirement homes all symbiotic one. Commercial fishermen removed
around the perimeter of the lake, a process which carnivorous species, which compete with bass, as
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well as aquatic weeds which clog water-cooled boat
motors. The evidence also showed no significant
bass by-catch in commercial seining. In short, the
needs of all concerned could be met with managed
seining and regulation of recreational fishing whose
own growth better explained sport fisher perceptions that bass populations were declining.
The FFW membership rejected these findings in spite of earlier promises to abide by the
results of the study. Instead, they cut a deal with
management agency administrators. In exchange
for an end to commercial fishing, the FFW and
FCC would deliver their support for a public referendum on a Constitutional amendment to create
an agency the legislature could not dissolve. The
amendment would provide legal autonomy and
fiscal security, both of which were necessary for
uniform and consistent resource management. The
Constitutional amendment passed, and the new
Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission
(GFC) set about fulfilling its part of the bargain;
they initiated the process of eliminating commercial fishing, the social and economic mainstay of an
uncounted number of wetland-based communities
including Shellcracker Haven.
The GFC effected the destruction of commercial fishing first by firing the chief fisheries
biologist whose studies proved inconvenient to
the recreational constituency’s public misrepresentation of commercial fishers as environmental
destroyers. Second, they banned seining on all but
the state’s two largest lakes. Third, they proscribed
the sale of panfish. Yet a central problem of natural
resource management remained: the inability to
enforce the rules promulgated by the Commission.
The GFC thus began to transform its newly
won fiscal security into development of an effective
wildlife police force. Beginning in 1947, the GFC
appropriated 72% of its budget to enforcement.
In 1950, the figure rose to $668,000; to $1.3
million in 1952; to $22.3 million in 1991. As a
reflection of the high priority given the wildlife
police, one fisheries biologist referred to them as
“the heartbeat of the commission.” Similarly, the
agency’s 1980 annual report described the Division
of Law Enforcement as “the sentinel charged with
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safeguarding this wildlife treasure from those who
would selfishly abuse it.”
The GFC began to train more wildlife
police, buy more guns (semi-automatic weapons
today), bullet-proof vests, cars, trucks, bigger
and faster boats to sail across grassy swamps, and
surveillance equipment, including airplanes, helicopters and communications systems. Now they
had the ability to put teeth into the authority with
which they could confiscate equipment used in the
illegal taking of fish and wildlife.
The heightened risks of production under
the new proscriptions immediately elevated the
prices of panfish, so commercial fishermen who
lacked economic alternatives took advantage of
the more profitable, albeit riskier, market. Some
continued to seine illegally, late at night, and in
boats painted black. Others developed creative
harvesting techniques such as “monkey-fishing,”
which involved a telephone and bare wires. These
efforts, as the following description reveals, sorely
tested the patience of the GFC’s wildlife officers.
The techniques of these illegal operators along
with social attitudes held by some of the local citizens make for an almost impossible enforcement
situation. To throw a monkey machine overboard
to avoid arrest by a nearby wildlife officer would
cost the violator only approximately $30.00 whereas he may often take as much as $50.00 worth of
catfish in one night’s operation.
In more organized operations, the violators
would transfer all of their machines into an exceptionally fast escape boat when approached by an
officer. This flat bottom, light boat driven by two
high horse-power kickers [motors] will out distance
the pursuing officers and then return to reissue the
machines when the officers depart. In other cases,
the violators will work in pairs and when an officer approaches, they are pursued in a near lateral
course. If the officer is able to overtake them, they
throw the monkey machines in the adjacent boat.
If the officer approaches the other boat, then it is
thrown into the original boat. After a few flying
transfers, then the machines are left in one boat and
the sack, which previously contained the machines,
is filled with a couple of bricks and thrown into the
other boat. This boat in turn separates from his
partner and if the officers manage to apprehend
this operator, they find bricks instead of evidence.
These techniques in addition to almost com-
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commercial technology and species left to them.
plete lack of convictions of the violators that were
apprehended creates a demoralizing situation for
Today, they refer to this period in their history as
the officers on duty in the area. For instance,
“the starvin’ time” when no one could earn enough
since 1953 there have been thirteen monkey fishto meet basic needs. They began to hunt alligators
ing cases made in Putnam County with only two
more intensively during this period to help make
convictions. There are approximately one hundred
ends meet with the hides they could sell. But here
part- or full-time “monkey” operators in the area.
too they retained their vulnerable market position
(Luethy 1956)
Why, in light of the biological studies, did and made very little from the occasional and unthe GFC make the management decisions it did? scrupulous hide-buyers who passed through the
The answer could not be found simply in sound town.
Then in 1967, alligators were placed on
biological principles, but rather in the relationship
the
Endangered
Species List and again a wetland
between money and power. Recreational users
contributed 94% of the GFC’s annual budget in and lacustrine resource they exploited locally was
1947, a figure which dwarfed the contributions effectively expropriated. Some engaged in “poachand drowned out the voices of the state’s minority ing,” and in wasteful and destructive ways. One
commercial fishermen as well as the voices of all man told me how he hunted alligators at night,
but those legislators who represented seiners of took them into the weeds to skin them, and abanthe largest scale. Luethy (1956), who replaced his doned the carcass, including the meat, to rot at the
boss, the fired chief fisheries biologist, made this site. This same man explained, however, that he
felt he had no choice because, as he put it, “I had
relationship explicit.
young’uns to feed.” Such is the inevitable impact of
[T]he economic and aesthetic values of sport
exclusion and resultant poverty on the non-human
fishing are recognized and accepted in present day
elements of the environment.
society. . . . Its values far outweigh those of the fresh
water commercial fisheries. Recognition of this
situation has resulted in aggressive and widespread
opposition by sports fishing interests to any real or
assumed interference by commercial operations.
Whether or not this concept is justified is beside
the point. . . . Commercial fisheries in the area4
contribute approximately one-third of fisheries revenue, whereas, sport fishing industries two-thirds.

By the time I began interviewing fisheries
biologists in 1992, the relationship between the
GFC and recreational users of Florida’s fish and
wildlife had grown so close that GFC biologists
I spoke to no longer distinguished between recreational users and “the public” the agency exists to
serve.
Ultimately, growth in the GFC’s enforcement budget translated into risks which far outweighed perceived benefits of illegal commercial
fishing in Shellcracker Haven. Fishing families
reorganized their kin-based production system
around cat-fishing with trotlines, the only legal
4

Alligator Hunting
The politicization of natural resource management is inescapable. The decision to eliminate
commercial freshwater fishing was based on the
relationship between politics and economics rather
than on biological evidence and social-economic
reality. Could future management decisions do
otherwise? Retrospective evaluations of alligator
hide sales during this period, as well as rebound
data, suggest that GFC biologists erred in their
determination that alligators should be added to
the list of endangered species. Agency managers
again based their decisions on the ideological construction of ecosystems which defined commercial
extractors as parasites to be excluded in the interest
of “conservation.” And again, local wetland communities that had generations of training in the
ecological dynamics of the basin, were taken out of
the resource management loop. Their managerial
removal of sport fish predators and exotic aquatic

Here he refers specifically to Lake George, the state’s second-largest lake.
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weeds have since cost taxpayers millions of dollars the program depended on the luck of the draw in
as the state has had to take over these tasks. The a state lottery in which traditional trappers made
GFC also had to hire “nuisance hunters” to handle up a tiny percentage of the large applicant pool of
the predictable conflicts between Florida’s growing inexperienced recreational hunters.
human population and prolific alligators.
The number of applications in the pool
When the GFC initiated experimental al- for the years 1988-1991 were, respectively, 5855;
ligator hunts in 1981, they recruited experienced 20,163; 10,122; and 15,311. From these pools,
trappers from Shellcracker Haven to educate the the numbers of permits available were 238; 229;
GFC biologists in the ways of alligators and hunt- 189; and 188 respectively. Of the 1990 particiers. For seven years, trappers taught program pants, for which a survey was carried out, only 2
biologists everything they knew about alligator of 139 respondents relied on commercial fishing
behavior under different conditions, ways to kill or trapping for even half of their annual household
them, skinning and butchering methods, and how income. Over 83% said they derived no income
to preserve the raw hide. They also taught GFC from hunting and fishing.
managers how hunters could subvert GFC regulaOnce again, the state excluded local comtion of hunting and marketing.
munities from the resources on which they deEach participating household earned an pended. This time, exclusion was easier because
average of $2700 per year, money which went the number of people now living in extractioninto shoes, boat repairs, trips to the dentist, and dependent communities were even smaller in
other necessities of which the community had been relative terms, and the enforcement branch of the
deprived for years. In addition to the income, trap- agency had been fully equipped, highly trained,
ping for the GFC also reestablished kin-based ties and authorized to enforce all the laws of the state.
to the basin ecosystem along the same lines as those Very few dare poach alligators any more, and public
knowledge of these activities is the result of these
needed in earlier years for cooperative seining.
Although the data are anecdotal, it is signif- few having been caught. Except for a tiny pool of
icant that during this period, when the community subsistence fishers and a few part-time frog-giggers
ties to the lake and wetland received renewal and and bait-seiners, exclusion of extraction-dependent
fortification from the benefits of experimental al- wetland communities is complete in Orange Creek
ligator hunting, a multinational corporation sought Basin. The lake has effectively been transferred to
a permit from the county commission to build recreational users who visit seasonally, and to the
condominiums on Shellcracker Lake. Trappers businesses that serve them.
from Shellcracker Haven organized and went to
the county commission and convinced them that Costs of Exclusion
The earlier history of Shellcracker Haven
condominiums would hurt the alligator population
shows that social and economic detachment from
because of damage to the wetland.
GFC resource managers celebrated when the wetland basin-induced poverty and desperation
commissioners denied the permit, but resource as families continued to extract resources illegally to
managers who noted the important connection support themselves. The attempt by a large corpobetween community trappers, traditional ties to the ration to build condominiums on Shellcracker Lake
wetland basin, program benefits, and the successful during the experimental alligator hunts also shows
political activism could not override the demands how a locally vested interest in a natural resource
of the agency’s recreational constituency. When the can be transformed into political activism on behalf
experiments were completed, the proposed Alliga- of a fragile wetland ecosystem. In recent years,
tor Management Program abandoned the residency Shellcracker Lake, suffering from twenty years of
requirement for program participation. Rather, the drought, dropped so low as to precipitate an ecoability to participate in the public hunt element of nomic crisis among tourist-dependent businesses.
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea/vol2/iss1/5 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.2.1.5
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Rental boats sat in the mud of drying marinas, and to see the problem. Resource managers also called
lake-side cabins remained unoccupied. Hydrilla, a meeting to which all were invited. Here bioloan exotic aquatic weed, exploded into bloom all gists explained not only that the proposed soluover the lake and clogged the few boat motors on tions would do more harm than good but that the
the water. Business at lake-edge fish camps, bait drought-induced drop in lake levels was a natural
shops, stores and restaurants dropped off precipi- and necessary part of the lake’s ecological cycle.
To the ears of wetland newcomers, many of whom
tously.
The state responded with Sonar, an $880- were losing money, such reassurances offered little
per-gallon herbicide, to kill the aquatic weeds comfort. They went to the county commission to
commercial fishermen once removed routinely ask for help only to be told that the commissioners
with their seines. Near the shore, hydrilla rotted had no authority over the low water spillway and
after the sprayings and sent an unpleasant stench could not determine who did, and that they had no
into lakefront homes. Then came the county tax authority over spraying, dredging or the introducappraiser to the towns around the lake to triple tion of carp. To reduce the heat they were feeling,
the appraised value of lake-front properties. “For however, the commission organized the Orange
Sale” signs went up everywhere for the overpriced Creek Basin Task Force to study the matter.
Only long-term residents agreed with what
homes and businesses no one wanted on the edge
of what increasingly resembled a mudhole. Lake- the biologists said because they had seen the lake
front homeowners and business owners organized fall and rise before, but this agreement showed
to push for a tax reassessment, to mobilize state up only in my fieldnotes. In Shellcracker Haven,
agencies to help them through the economic crisis, where lake-edge ownership had long ago gone to
and to move the proper authorities—though it was recreational users, where seining was prohibited,
where alligator hunting now depended on the luck
never clear who they were—to “fix” the lake.
From around the lake, a coalition of of the draw in a state lottery, and where trucks and
businesses and homeowners emerged, brought boat trailers meant locals could fish on other lakes
together around their concern for their financial anyway, only three men attended two of the many
investments. Yet these vested interests could not meetings with resource management personnel to
compensate for their naiveté concerning long-term discuss solutions to the economic and ecological
ecosystem health. Some wanted to stop spraying crisis. Their experience had taught them that,
the lake with herbicides and instead stock it with beyond the point at which managers ceased to
hydrilla-eating carp, a solution plant biologists as- gain something, those who would make decisions
sured them would transform the fishing lake into concerning the lake really had little interest in what
a barren skiing lake. Others wanted to increase lake residents had to say.
Meanwhile, the Orange Creek Basin Task
the spraying, a solution which would cost a great
deal of money and would not accelerate the rate Force met a few times and verbally slugged it out.
at which hydrilla was already dying. Some wanted As task forces go, they were probably no worse than
to raise and renovate the low-water spillway con- any other. They could not make it rain; they could
structed when a sinkhole drained one of the basin’s not affect the low water dam because no one had
lakes in the 1950s. Biologists pointed out that authority over it; they could not influence decisions
the rate of evaporation was more significant in made about herbicides; they could neither finance
falling water levels than the water leaving through nor get permission to stock the lakes with carp;
the dam. Others wanted someone in charge to and they were told by an engineer from the Water
dredge fish camp boat ramps and the creek which Management District that another study would
have to precede any decision regarding dredging.
connected the lakes.
The Coalition to Save Our Lakes called At their last meeting, the task force agreed not to
meetings and invited county commissioners out make any decisions except not to meet again for a
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year.
velopment strategy is hotly debated. In addition
“Ecocide” is a term that describes the de- to ethical objections to the “use” of animal species,
liberate destruction of the environment. Late one those who oppose sustainable use believe that
night, a determined and unidentified interest group the profit orientation of markets will ultimately
carried iron rods (“rebar”), professionally welded render any use unsustainable. Evidence abounds,
metal plates, and bags of cement to the low water they say, that consumer society has gone mad and
dam that a few had held responsible for the lake’s is destroying its own subsistence base. Capitalist
low levels. They filled the notch in the dam because ideologies which promote self-interested, marketthere was nothing else to do to vent their frustra- oriented rationality overtly fuel economic growth
tion. The county commission called them outlaws, based on unrestrained natural resource extraction
and the local newspaper called them villains and (Redclift 1987). Landfills fill up, and new ones are
vigilantes who showed contempt for the commis- opened. If our species survives long enough, we
sion’s attempt to mediate the situation. Locally, are without doubt creating unprecedented treasures
and in Shellcracker Haven, the mystery engineers upon which archeologists, if no one else, can be
were known as heroes and letters to the editor in sustained into eternity.
the newspaper countered “the official view.”
It is this model for development which
The dam “repair” meant nothing for the Trainer (1990) describes when he advocates market
lake one way or the other. The drought had already detachment in development strategies. But this
reduced water levels well below the notch where the model for development does not apply equally well
muck had dried hard enough to stand on. Still, as everywhere. Capitalism is a malleable economic
an assertion of its authority, the County Commis- system, one which local communities such as
sion determined to locate the culprits and unplug Shellcracker Haven adjust and transform to suit
the dam. They could not, however, undo the dam- their own needs. Yet consumer society, a culture
age because nothing of the bureaucratic complexity wholly dependent on an ideological commitment
which prevented the dam’s earlier modification had to scarcity, begins with alienation of producers from
changed. They would still need permission from a products, of people from land and other means
still undetermined authority, and the culprits were of production. This detachment, like the notion
never caught.
of scarcity itself (Sahlins 1972), is neither natural
nor inevitable nor, as yet, universal. Nor must
Conclusion
local decision-making regarding the relationship
Shellcracker Haven is one of a growing between production, distribution and community
number of case studies which come to similar development be subordinated to an ideology of
conclusions about the relationship between people, individual self-interested capitalism.
poverty and ecosystem health (see Susan Stonich
Rather than detaching communities
1993). Studies also demonstrate the benefits of from fragile ecosystems and supplanting locally
collective management of common property re- informed traditional resource management with
sources, a direct and powerful rebuttal to Hardin’s distanced state-level regimes, a long-range vision
mistaken Tragedy of the Commons (Berkes 1985; should direct management policies to secure the
Posey 1989; Hitchcock 1990; McCabe 1992; tie between people and their traditions. Resource
Stanley 1993). What distinguishes many of the managers, developers, and policy makers can do
socio-ecological systems which have been studied, this by promoting collaboration between ecologists
however, is not shelter from the market, but and local communities on resource management
rather, local control over extraction and the dis- and economic development, not by wishing the
tribution of benefits which accrue from market market away as Trainer and others would have
participation.
us do. The alternative is external control over
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tion of benefits by those with little knowledge of
local ecosystem dynamics, and with no traditional
incentives to preserve and protect long-term and
short-term profitability. Thus, the lesson from
Florida’s historical development helps us frame the
fundamental issue underpinning the relationships
between conservation of biological diversity, local
cultural ecology and economic development: if development is to be made sustainable, local interest
in and control over the development process must
first be sustained.
Local participation and benefits are the
minimum criteria for the survival of any social
ecological system. And local control on late twentieth century Earth requires money with which to
purchase voice, autonomy and power. Tragically,
the monetization of all human activity may relegate
those less profitable societies to museums where
what they could have taught us about sustainable
use will have been lost. Perhaps, it is a fitting irony
that we will have to pay to see what is left of them.
Yet the vision of community development outside
and apart from the market economy is a mirage, a
serpent-free Eden imagined by a romantic anthropology. Would it not be even more tragic to lose
all cultural diversity because, in our zeal to protect
and shield our culture gardens from the corrupting influence of the snake, we won the argument
that denied diverse societies the means by which
to defend themselves?
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